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CITATION TO THE RECORD 
The Utah State Tax Commission ("Tax Commission") heard 
evidence by Petitioner and Respondents regarding a determination 
of the Uintah County Board of Equalization ("Board"). Citations 
to the record will be abbreviated as follows: 
Record on Appeal: R. 
Transcript of the formal adjudicative proceedings: T. 
The Addendum includes relevant portions of the record, and 
shall be cited to as "A." with the appropriate page number, 
JURISDICTION 
This matter is before the Utah Supreme Court pursuant to 
Utah Code Ann. § 78-2-2(3)(e)(ii), and Rule 14, Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure. 
ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW 
AND 
STANDARD OF REVIEW 
1. The Tax Commission's remand of the case for 
determination of the fair market value of the subject property is 
futile, serves no useful purpose and is, consequently, an abuse 
of discretion, or arbitrary and capricious. 
2. The Tax Commission's rejection of Petitioner's 
appraisal of the market value of the subject property was based 
on determinations of fact not supported by substantial evidence 
when viewed in light of the whole record before the court. 
3. When the Tax Commission rejected Petitioner's appraisal 
methodology it erroneously applied the law. 
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4. The Tax Commission failed to follow its own prescribed 
procedures. 
5. The Board's valuation of the property subjects 
Petitioner to potentially confiscatory taxes and the Tax 
Commission's failure to correct the overassessment is a violation 
of Petitioner's constitutional rights. 
The standard of appellate review of each of these issues is 
set forth in the appropriate section. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
This case is a review of an order of the Tax Commission 
rejecting Petitioner's evidence of fair market value and 
remanding to the Uintah County Board of Equalization for the 
submission of additional evidence. Petitioner challenges the 
accuracy of the Tax Commission's conclusion that Petitioner's 
appraisal method did not conform to the generally accepted 
practices of the appraisal profession and its rejection of 
Petitioner's evidence of fair market value. 
Petitioner further claims that the valuation of the property 
is confiscatory andf therefore, unconstitutional. Finally, 
Petitioner claims that remand for additional evidence is futile, 
an abuse of discretion, or arbitrary and capricious. 
STATEMENT OF THE FACTS 
The property at issue in this case is undeveloped land in a 
remote area of Uintah County. The above-named entities, Utah 
Shale Land & Minerals Corp. ("Utah Shale"), Uintah Oil 
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Association ("Uintah Oil"), and Utah Oil Shales, Inc. ("Utah 
Oil") (jointly "Petitioner"), own parcels of contiguous property. 
Since 1981, the properties have qualified for assessment and 
taxation as agricultural land pursuant to the Farmland Assessment 
Act, Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-502 (1) (a) (i) . The property has been 
utilized for grazing for the past sixty (60) years and leased for 
grazing continuously since 1949. Although the property consists 
of patented oil shale mining claims, none of the properties has 
had minerals extracted, except in nominal amounts for testing and 
discovery purposes, and none of the properties has ever been 
operated as a mine. 
For the tax year 1989, the Uintah County Board of 
Equalization set the value of the land at $50.00 per acre, 
resulting in a fair market value of $960,026.00 for the property 
held by Utah Shale, $101,948.00 for the holdings of Uintah Oil, 
and $113,935.00 for the holdings of Utah Oil. Petitioner 
requested that the market value, based on an April, 1989 
appraisal, be established at $4.00 per acre, or $75,400.00, 
$8,100.00, and $9,000.00, respectively. 
The Board's decision was, apparently, embodied in corrected 
tax notices of 1989 assessments which valued the land at $50.00 
per acre. The companies appealed the decision of the Board to 
the Tax Commission. After taking evidence in formal adjudicative 
proceedings on October 11, 1990, the Tax Commission issued three 
separate orders dated March 28, 1991, which rejected Petitioner's 
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requested fair market value. The Tax Commission determined that 
Petitioner's contract rents did not conform to the market rents 
and that/ in such a case, market rents must be used for 
acceptable appraisal methodology. The Tax Commission rejected 
Petitioner's appraised fair market value as unreliable and also 
found that evidence presented by the Board was insufficient to 
indicate a reliable value, due to the Board's use of comparable 
sales with little comparability. The Tax Commission remanded the 
case for further proceedings before the Board for the submission 
of additional evidence. 
Each company petitioned for a writ of review of the order 
which rejected Petitioner's evidence of fair market value of the 
property and which remanded the matter for further proceedings. 
The Petitions have been consolidated for further proceedings in 
this matter. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENTS 
Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by unequal 
assessment and made subject to potentially confiscatory rollback 
taxes based on the unsupported market value of the property as 
set by the Board and the Tax Commission. The Commission's 
determination of fair market value is to be reversed if 
unreasonable. Where all the evidence required to fix market 
value by generally accepted appraisal practice was presented in 
the formal adjudicative proceedings, and no other substantive 
evidence is available, the Commission's refusal to accept 
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Petitioner's appraised fair market value and remand for 
additional evidence was unreasonable and an abuse of its 
discretion. Further, the Commission's decision is arbitrary and 
capricious because it is not based upon the relevant factors set 
forth in the testimony and documents submitted as evidence. 
Remand would serve no useful purpose, and the Commission should 
be ordered by this Court to correct the overassessment of the 
property. 
When viewed in light of the whole record before the Court, 
the Commission's factual findings are not based on substantial 
evidence. Petitioner's evidence was presented by an expert in 
ranch properties management. The Board's evidence was presented 
by a county employee, not qualified as an expert at the hearing. 
The evidence shows that Petitioner's contract rents are within 
reasonable range of the lease rates for similar properties; thus, 
Petitioner's contract rents conform to the market. Petitioner's 
appraisal relied on comparable sales to fix the property's fair 
market value. The Commission's determination that it could not 
accept Petitioner's appraisal because important data was not 
included was contrary to the evidence. The evidence has been 
marshalled for the Court's review, and the substantial evidence 
which is required to support an agency action based on 
determinations of fact is wholly lacking. Petitioner's appraised 
fair market value should be accepted by the Commission as the 
fair market value of the property. 
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The- Tax Commission was required to interpret the statutory 
term "fair market value" and to apply the statutory term to the 
facts of this case. The agency's interpretation of the law is 
reviewed for error. "Fair market value" is determined by 
estimation of the sales price of the property by generally 
recognized appraisal methods. The Commission's refusal to accept 
Petitioner's appraisal estimating the property's fair market 
value by a generally accepted appraisal method constituted an 
erroneous interpretation of the statutory term "fair market 
value" which this Court may reverse merely because it disagrees 
with the agency's interpretation. 
The Commission is required to accept uncontradicted 
evidence, unless inherently improbable or only within the 
possession of one party, as being true. The Commission's refusal 
to accept Petitioner's uncontradicted evidence is reviewed for 
error. The decision that Petitioner had not met its burden of 
proving the Board's valuation incorrect was based on the 
Commission's failure to follow prescribed procedures, for which 
Petitioner is entitled to relief. 
The Board's unsupported and incorrect valuation and 
assessment of the subject property and the Commission's failure 
to correct the overassessment results in an unconstitutional 
taking of Petitioner's property in violation of state and federal 
constitutions. The proposed remand denies Petitioner due process 
because it sets an impossibly high threshold for proof necessary 
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to rebut the Board's valuation. The proposed taxation is 
confiscatory in that it exceeds the income generated annually 
from the property's highest and best use and subjects Petitioner 
to potentially excessive rollback taxes. The Board's valuation 
is not based on an assessment of fair market value, but is simply 
an adoption of the Commission's arbitrary valuation of $50 per 
acre, and unsupported by credible evidence. Assessment at that 
valuation effectively confiscates Petitioner's property. The 
proposed valuation is arbitrary and not based on fair market 
value in contradiction of §§ 2 and 3, Article XIII of the Utah 
Constitution, which requires that valuations be reasonably 
uniform and designed to achieve a fair cash value. Although the 
state's arbitrary valuation of $50 per acre provides uniformity, 
it fails to achieve fair cash value in violation of the Utah 
Constitutional provisions. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT THE PETITIONER'S 
APPRAISAL DID NOT RELIABLY FIX THE MARKET VALUE OF THE 
SUBJECT PROPERTY AND ITS REMAND FOR ADDITIONAL EVIDENCE 
WERE BEYOND THE LIMITS OF REASON AND RATIONALITY AND, 
THEREFORE, AN ABUSE OF DISCRETION OR, IN THE 
ALTERNATIVE, ARBITRARY AND CAPRICIOUS. 
A. Unreasonable Action by Commission. 
With regard to unreasonable actions of an agency, § 63-46b-
16(4) states: 
(4) The Appellate Court shall grant relief only 
if, on the basis of the agency's record, it determines 
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that a person seeking judicial review has been 
substantially prejudiced by any of the following: 
• • • • 
(h) The agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated 
to the agency by statute; 
• • • • 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious, 
(A. 34-35) 
In this case, Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced 
by the Commission's conclusion that Petitioner's appraisal did 
not conform to generally accepted practices of the appraisal 
profession and, therefore, did not reliably establish market 
value. Petitioner is subject to unequal assessment and 
potentially confiscatory roll-back taxes based on the unsupported 
market value of the property adopted by the Tax Commission and 
incorporated by the Uintah County Board of Equalization. 
Consequently, this Court may grant Petitioner relief if the 
agency's action is an abuse of the discretion delegated to the 
agency by statute. 
According to this Court's decision in Morton v. 
International, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 163 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 34, 36 (Utah 1991), "an agency has abused its discretion 
when the agency's action, viewed in the context of the language 
and purpose of the governing statute, is unreasonable." Morton 
also holds that an agency action based upon facts not supported 
by substantial evidence constitutes an abuse of discretion. 163 
Utah Adv. Rep. at 42, fn. 7. Furthermore, relief may be granted 
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when the agency has abused a grant of discretion contained in the 
agency's governing statute. 
The legislature, in many instances, has explicitly 
granted agencies discretion in dealing with specific 
statutory terms. Apart from such explicit grants of 
authority, courts have also recognized that grants of 
discretion may be implied from the statutory language. 
. . . . 
However, it is clear from the wording of § 63-46b-16 
that an agency's statutory construction should only be 
given deference when there is a grant of discretion to 
the agency concerning the language in question, either 
expressly made in the statute or implied from the 
statutory language. 
Morton International, 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. It is necessary 
to determine whether the Commission has been granted discretion 
to construe the statutory term, "fair market value." Absent a 
grant of discretion, the Commission's construction will not be 
given deference and will be reviewed for correctness. Morton 
Internationalf 163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 43, fn. 38. 
The Utah Legislature did not explicitly grant to the Tax 
Commission discretion regarding issues of what constitutes "fair 
market value" under § 59-2-102(2). (A. 30) This court made a 
similar inquiry regarding the Commission's discretion to construe 
the statutory term, "equipment", in MQrtpn International. In 
that case, taxpayer Morton sought review of the Tax Commission's 
determination that the shells of Morton's production facilities 
were not so specialized as to constitute "equipment" under Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-12-104(16) and therefore be exempted from sales 
and use taxes. The Court determined that such a classification 
by the agency could not be made using traditional methods of 
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statutory construction and that it was routinely the kind of 
determination performed by the Commission. IcL at 39. On that 
basisf this Court held that the Commission's decision was 
entitled to deference. Nevertheless/ the decision of the 
Commission would be overturned if its decision was unreasonable. 
Ostensibly, in the case at bar, the Commission remanded this 
case to the Board for assistance in the construction of the 
statutory term, "fair market value." Petitioner contends that a 
remand for the taking of additional evidence is an abuse of the 
agency's discretion because (1) adequate and credible evidence 
required to fix the market value was presented at the formal 
adjudicative proceedings and (2) there simply is no other 
evidence available. According to Uintah County Assessor Lorin 
Merkley, comparable sales with which to compare Petitioner's 
property are "as scarce as hen's teeth." (T. 58) On behalf of 
the Board, Merkley offered smaller land tracts for comparison, 
conceding that they were "the nearest to the type of land that 
we're talking about that we can find for any sales." (T. 62) 
Even that meager evidence was eventually withdrawn by the Board. 
(T. 64-65) 
Petitioner admittedly has the burden of proof that the 
Board's valuation is incorrect. To that end, Petitioner 
introduced credible and uncontradicted evidence of market value 
through its expert, Steven F. Wiles, to support the appraisals 
submitted to the hearing officer. The Board presented no 
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documentary evidence of market value. Instead the Board relied 
on the testimony of Mr. Merkley, a county employee not qualified 
as an expert at the hearing, concerning undocumented and 
unsubstantiated comparable sales which, in the Tax Commission's 
view, were not comparable. The Tax Commission refused to 
acknowledge that additional evidence was not available. 
Requiring the taxpayer to engage in the futile exercise of once 
again scouring the land transactions within the relevant vicinity 
of the subject property is an unreasonable requirement which 
constitutes an abuse of discretion from which the taxpayers are 
entitled to relief. 
B. Arbitrary and Capricious Commission Decision* 
The Commission's Decision is also arbitrary and capricious. 
Federal administrative law cases frequently address the issue of 
what constitutes arbitrary and capricious conduct by an agency. 
The Ninth Circuit describes the inquiry as "deciding whether 
there has been a clear error of judgment and whether the agency 
action was based upon consideration of relevant factors." United 
States Vt Alpine i^ and and Reservoir Co./ 887 F.2d 207, 213 (9th 
Cir. 1989), quoting Motor Vehicle Mfrs. Assoc. of the United 
States Vt State Farm Mutual Automobile Inst Co,/ 463 U.S. 29, 43, 
103 S.Ct. 2856, 2866, 77 L.Ed.2d 443 (1983). In the present 
case, the Tax Commission's Decision could not have been based 
upon the relevant factors because the evidence before the 
Commission clearly preponderated in Petitioner's favor. 
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The Decision is a result of a clear error of judgment by the 
Tax Commission. Rather than basing the Decision on the relevant 
factors set forth in the testimony and documents admitted as 
evidence, the Commission simply remanded for additional evidence 
which both the Board and Petitioner agree is not available. The 
Tax Commission must base its decision upon the relevant factors 
or be found to be arbitrary and capricious. See Carlsen v. State 
of Utah, Department of Social Services, 722 P.2d 775 (Utah 1986). 
In addition, the remand for additional evidence before the 
Uintah County Board of Equalization is futile where none is 
available. This Court has stated that exhaustion of 
administrative remedies may not be necessary when it would serve 
no useful purpose. Johnson v. Utah State Retirement Office, 621 
P.2d 1234, 1237 (Utah 1980). This is such a case. The remand 
ordered by the Tax Commission prejudices Petitioner by delay and 
the possibility of confiscatory roll-back taxes without any 
likelihood that the additional evidence the Commission demands 
can be provided. The Tax Commission has authority to correct the 
valuation of property which has been overassessed pursuant to 
R861-1-9A, Utah Administrative Code (A. 38), and should be 
directed by this Court to do so. 
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POINT H 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S FINDING THAT PETITIONER'S 
APPRAISAL DID NOT RELIABLY FIX THE MARKET VALUE 
OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY WAS BASED ON DETERMINATIONS 
OF FACT NOT SUPPORTED BY SUBSTANTIAL EVIDENCE. 
The Administrative Procedures Act of 1988 at Section 63-46b-
16(4)(g) states: 
(4) The appellate court shall grant 
relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking 
judicial review has been substantially 
prejudiced by any of the following: 
(g) the agency action is based 
upon a determination of fact, made or implied 
by the agency, that is not supported by 
substantial evidence when viewed in light of 
the whole record before the court 
An appellate court applying the "substantial evidence" 
test must consider both the evidence that supports the Tax 
Commission's factual findings and the evidence that detracts 
from the findings. Grace Drilling Co. v. Board Q£ Review, 
776 P.2d 63, 68 (Utah App. 1989). The Tax Commission's factual 
findings are not supported by substantial evidence. Instead, the 
evidence detracts from its findings. 
"Substantial evidence" is that quantum and quality of 
relevant evidence that is adequate to convince a reasonable mind 
to support a conclusion. Boston First National v. Salt Lake 
County Board, 799 P.2d 1163, 1165 (Utah 1990). Federal cases are 
in accord with the standard of "substantial evidence" which the 
Utah Administrative Procedures Act requires to support an agency 
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action based on determinations of fact. For example, the Ninth 
Circuit defines "substantial evidence" to "mean more than a mere 
scintilla." Cranston v. Clark, 767 F.2d 1319, 1320 (9th Cir. 
1985). Substantial evidence is such relevant evidence as a 
reasonable mind might accept as adequate to support a conclusion. 
Id. In the case at hand, substantial evidence to support the 
agency in its rejection of Petitioner's appraisal establishing 
market value is wholly lacking. 
The order of March 28f 1991, from which Petitioner appeals 
set forth seven findings of fact and two conclusions of law. In 
the section entitled "Decision and Order," ("Decision") (A. 1-21) 
the Tax Commission made additional determinations of fact. It is 
these latter determinations which the Appellant challenges as 
being unsupported by the evidence. 
A. The Finding That Current Market Rents For Similar Properties 
Are Significantly Higher Than $.96 Per AUM Is Not Supported 
by Substantial Evidence. 
The measure "AUM" is intended to reflect the number of 
animals a particular tract of land can support. It is an 
abbreviation of "Animal Unit Month", and is a number set by the 
Bureau of Land Management indicating that the land has grazing 
capacity to support one cow for one month or one sheep for five 
months. Nothing in the record indicates how the Commission 
arrived at the figure of $.96 per AUM. The evidence before the 
Tax Commission regarding current market rents for winter sheep 
grazing was offered by Steven L. Wiles, a certified appraiser 
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experienced in land management. Mr. Wiles based his appraisal on 
the following: visual inspection of the property (T. 28); 
assessment of vegetation, soil condition, current use (T. 29); 
assessment of the vegetation and soil characteristics of the area 
(T. 30); examination of Bureau of Land Management Records 
concerning the lack of any planned improvements in the area (T. 
30); observation and assessment of road leading to the property 
(T. 31); observation of soil erosion, elevation of the property, 
assessment of rainfall and presence of overgrazing (T. 32); 
calculation of the number of animals the property could graze per 
month and comparison with the number of animal unit months 
(AUM's) allocated by the BLM (T. 33-34); comparison with state 
grazing leases' alloted AUM's (T. 35); evaluation of the effect 
of the location of the land within the Indian Reservation 
(T. 36); assessment of comparable sales (T. 37); assessment of 
potential mineral lease income (T. 41). 
Mr. Wiles testified that the highest rent in the area for 
winter sheep grazing on land that was comparable as to acreage, 
vegetation, and within the Ute Reservation was $.23 per acre per 
year. (T. 49-50) Under questioning by the Board, the witness 
Edward M. Bown, an attorney with many years of experience with 
the subject property, testified that the BLM and Forest Service 
charged $1.81 per head per month as a grazing fee for the 
pasturing of cattle in 1989 ("AUM"). (T. 22) The remaining 
testimony on the issue was offered by Lorin Merkley, Uintah 
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County Assessor, who proposed as a hypothetical that the property 
could be leased as cow pasture at $6.00 a month per cow times 
2,670 AUMs for a value of $160,200.00 annually. (T. 53) 
However, the Board offered no documentary evidence in support of 
this assertion and presented its evidence through a county 
employee who did not demonstrate that he had conducted the type 
of analysis that is consistent with the type of analysis 
performed by Mr. Wiles. 
Petitioner objected to the Board's assumption that the 
property was appropriate for the use proposed by the Board. 
(T. 47-48) The Petitioner's testimony concluded that the land 
was unfenced and could be used for herded livestock only. (T. 
53) The testimony of the Board did not contradict Mr. Wiles' 
evidence that comparable land rents were between $.08 and at $.23 
per acre. Thus, the Tax Commission's determination that current 
market rents are significantly higher than $.96 per AUM is not 
supported by substantial evidence. 
B. The Finding That Petitioner's Appraisal Relies On Contract 
Rents Which Do Not Conform To Market Rents is Not Supported 
by Substantial Evidence. 
The Tax Commission's Decision found that Petitioner's 
appraisal utilized contract rents which did not conform to market 
rents to establish the fair market value of the property. (R. 7) 
"Fair market value" is defined in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(2) as 
the amount at which property would change hands between a willing 
buyer and a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to 
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buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the relevant 
facts, (A. 30) There was no substantial evidence before the 
Commission to establish that market rents differ from 
Petitioner's contract rents; neither was there substantial 
evidence that Petitioner's appraisal calculated the fair market 
value of the property utilizing non-conforming contract rents. 
1. The contract rents conform to the market. Evidence of 
market rents was presented by Petitioner's expert, Steven I. 
Wiles, whose appraisal cited comparable leases for winter sheep 
grazing at either $.08 per acre or $.23 per acre. (R. 22) There 
was testimony that the BLM and the Forest Service value an AUM at 
$1.81 (T. 22) but no testimony as to how that figure relates to 
rent-per-acre. Petitioner presented evidence that the surface 
use of each parcel of property generates $1,000.00 per year in 
income. (T. 17) The appraised lease value of the subject 
property was $.16 to $.19 per acre per year. (R. 22) 
The Board offered only the testimony of Lorin Merkley, 
Uintah County Assessor, to establish market rents. He presented 
no evidence that the highest and best use of the property was 
anything other than grazing. (T. 54) The Petitioner's expert 
concluded that the highest and best use was for sheep grazing. 
The Board produced no evidence that contradicted this conclusion 
and produced no evidence to substantiate the Board's offhand 
comment that the subject land could support cattle. The Board 
elicited testimony from Mr. Wiles that the lack of highway access 
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to the subject property would affect the transportation of 
animals to pasture. (T. 44) 
Based on the evidence before itf the Tax Commission could 
not reasonably and rationally conclude that the value of the 
Petitioner's grazing leases was less than the fair market rent 
per acre. Because of the nature of the land's remoteness, lack 
of improvements, and poor condition, the property is difficult to 
utilize. (T. 28-36) The Petitioner entered into an arm's length 
lease with a third party. That contract, in effect, establishes 
the market rents. 
2. Petitioner's appraisal relies on comparable sales, not 
income, to fix the property's fair market value. In accordance 
with acceptable appraisal practices of the industry, the 
Petitioner's expert found comparable land leases and listed them 
as a comparable factor. (R. 22) The Petitioner's expert 
rejected the income approach because all the parcels of property 
had a negative income. (T. 39) Petitioner's appraisal set the 
fair market value by the comparable sales method. (T. 39-40; R. 
15) Therefore, despite the inclusion of comparable leases in 
petitioner's appraisal, the Tax Commission's determination that 
Petitioner relied on non-conforming contract rents to fix the 
property's market value is not supported by the record. 
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C. The Tax Commission's Determination That Petitioner's 
Appraisal Lacked Important Data Elements Was Not Supported 
By Substantial Evidence. 
The Tax Commission's Decision observes that "the market 
approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal makes adjustments 
that appear to be very subjective and that are difficult to 
support with reliable market data." (R. 7; A. 3) Of course, an 
appraisal requires subjective evaluations. Despite its statutory 
definition in Utah Code Ann. § 59-2-102(2), according to Rio 
Algom Corpt vt San Juan County, 681 p.2d 184, 192 (Utah 1984), 
"market value" is at best an approximation. 
"Market value," the basis for all assessment 
valuation, is an attempt to create a 
fictitious sale of the subject property by 
assuming an owner willing to sell and a buyer 
desiring to buy 
Rio Algomf 681 P.2d at 192, quoting Matter Ql McCannel/ 
301 N.W.2d 910, 924 (Minn. 1980). 
The Board's sole and non-expert witness acknowledged in his 
testimony that comparable sales were extremely scarce. (T. 62) 
Nonetheless, using the relevant information available, 
Petitioner's expert presented market data to support his 
professional opinion and established value of the subject 
property. (T. 27-42) Despite the presentation of the relevant 
information available, the Tax Commission determined that 
Petitioner's appraisal was unreliable because it, supposedly, 
omitted the dates when the comparables were sold, and the 
comparables' exact acreage. (R. 7) 
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The Commission's conclusion on this point directly 
contradicts the testimony of Steven L. Wiles who testified that 
the comparables sold for cash within one year of the date of the 
appraisal, April 1, 1989. (T. 38) Wiles1 testimony is backed by 
the additional evidence of the appraisals themselves.1 (R. 13-
46) Those appraisals showf on page 14, the dates of sale of the 
three comparables to be January 3, 1989, and November, 1988, (R. 
26) two of the comparables having sold on the earlier date. 
The Tax Commission was also clearly wrong when it decided 
that Petitioner's appraisal omitted important data regarding 
acreage of the comparables. Wiles' testimony was that the most 
comparable tract of land, "Little Emma", was of the same acreage 
as the subject property. (T. 38) Wiles' testimony further 
identified the comparable tracts as "large tracts of land that 
were put to the same use as the subject property was [put] that 
were close to the subject property." (T. 37) When asked whether 
the comparables were the same size tracts as the subject 
property, that is, several-thousand-acre tracts, Mr. Wiles 
replied, "thousands of acres, yes." (T. 37) The exact acreage 
of each parcel is set forth in the Petitioner's appraisals 
1
 Although the three Petitions for Review have been 
consolidated in these proceedings, the record on appeal has not 
been consecutively numbered by the Tax Commission. As a result, 
there are minor page differences between the records for each 
Petition. For the sake of clarity and brevity, Petitioner refers 
to the pages as they are numbered in the file of Uintah Oil 
Association, Petitioner, Case No. 910183, and to those of Utah 
Shale Land & Minerals Corp., Petitioner, Case No. 910185, only 
where different. 
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(R. 22) as 2039 acres (Uintah Oil), 2278 acres (Utah Oil) (R. 22) 
and 19,200 acres (Utah Shale) (R. 23). 
There is nothing in the record to show how the Tax 
Commission arrived at its determination that Petitioner presented 
insufficient evidence to fix the value of the property. The 
Board presented no documentary evidence regarding value of the 
property. (T. 65) The County's sole witness who had not been 
qualified as an expert testified that the County had not done a 
reappraisal* of properties since 1982. (T. 56-57) The value of 
the property which the Board claims to be $50.00 per acre (R. 6) 
was based on the "value that the State of Utah carried on the 
property when they turned it over to the County jurisdiction 
about, oh, roughly a year ago . . . ." (T. 56) The Board 
proposed no competing appraisal for the Tax Commission's 
consideration, nor did the Board elicit any testimony regarding 
comparables' acreage or other information which served as the 
basis of the Petitioner's appraisal. The Board's only witness 
testified that Petitioner's expert made a "pretty fair 
assessment" of the characteristics of the property appraised. 
(T. 57) Accordingly, there was no evidence before the Commission 
that essential data elements were omitted from Petitioner's 
appraisal which would have made the Petitioner's determination of 
fair market value unreliable. This determination of fact by the 
Commission is not supported by substantial evidence. 
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D. The Tax Commission's Action Was Based on Determinations of 
Fact Not Supported by Substantial Evidence, 
The Tax Commission remanded this case because the 
Petitioner's appraisal did not reliably fix the market value of 
the property at $4.00 per acre. As shown above, the record does 
not contain the substantial evidence required to support the 
agency action in its rejection of the market value established by 
the Petitioner's evidence. Thus, it is error to remand the 
matter to the Uintah County Board of Equalization to take 
additional evidence. The error is compounded when the evidence 
established that there was no other information available. (T. 
58, 62-63) 
The Board presented no evidence to support the Tax 
Commission's Decision. The evidence having been marshalled for 
the Court's review, the record is clear that it is Petitioner who 
presented uncontradicted substantial evidence establishing the 
fair market value of the property. 
POINT III 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S CONCLUSION THAT PETITIONER'S 
APPRAISAL METHODOLOGY DID NOT CONFORM TO GENERALLY 
ACCEPTED PRACTICES AND DID NOT RELIABLY INDICATE 
MARKET VALUE OF THE SUBJECT PROPERTY IS AN 
ERRONEOUS INTERPRETATION OF THE LAW. 
Determination of "fair market value" requires the Tax 
Commission to interpret and apply that statutory term to the 
facts of this case. The standard of this Court's review of the 
Tax Commission's interpretation of the law is set forth in Savage 
Industries, Inc. v. Utah State Tax Commission, 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 
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5 (Utah 1991). In Savage Industriesr petitioner sought review of 
the Tax Commission's determination that subsidiary corporations 
were not entitled to carry over their own pre-acquisition losses 
in determining their annual income for the petitioner's 
consolidated returns. This Court looked to section 63-46b-
16(4)(d) to determine the breadth of its review of the agency's 
interpretation. 
Under section 63-46b-16(4)(d), a court may grant relief 
based upon an agency's erroneous interpretation of the 
law. This incorporates the correction of error 
standard previously applied by Utah courts in cases 
involving agency interpretations of law. 
Savage Industries, Inc., 160 Utah Adv. Rep. 5, 7 (Utah 1991). 
As further guidance, this Court quoted the comments to the 
Model State Administrative Procedure Act: 
Paragraph (c)(4) includes two distinct matters— 
interpretation and application of the law. With regard 
to the agency's interpretation to [sic] the law, courts 
generally give little deference to the agency, with the 
result that a court may decide that the agency has 
erroneously interpreted the law if the court merely 
disagrees with the agency's interpretation. 
Savage Industries
 F Inc.f 160 Utah Adv. Rep. at 8. 
The term "fair market value" is defined in Utah Code Ann. 
§59-2-102(2) : 
(2) "Fair market value" means the amount at which 
property would change hands between a willing buyer and 
a willing seller, neither being under any compulsion to 
buy or sell and both having reasonable knowledge of the 
relevant facts. 
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Since most properties are not actually bought or sold on 
January 1, county appraisers must estimate the fair market value 
of the properties as of that date using recognized appraisal 
methods which are not set by the statute. The three generally 
recognized appraisal methods for determining fair market value 
are the cost, income, and market/comparable sales approaches. In 
the instant case, Petitioner relied upon the comparable sales 
approach because the income approach would have resulted in a 
negative value. As discussed in Point II, above, there was no 
evidence before the Tax Commission to establish that Petitioner's 
appraisal was defective or unreliable. The fair market value 
which serves as the basis for taxation of Petitioner's property 
was established as the statute required, by estimating a 
fictitious sale price. 
Where Petitioner's appraisal estimated the fair market value 
of the property by a generally accepted appraisal method, the Tax 
Commission's refusal to accept that estimate is an erroneous 
interpretation of the statutory term "fair market value." Under 
the correctness standard set forth in Savage Industries, this 
Court may decide that the agency's interpretation is wrong merely 
because this Court finds that the fair market value of the 
property has, in fact, been properly estimated. Based on the 
evidence before the Commission, the appraisal was reliable. 
Petitioner is, therefore, entitled to relief. The Tax 
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Commission's action must be reversed and the Petitioner's 
appraisal value accepted as the fair market value. 
POINT IV 
THE TAX COMMISSION FAILED TO FOLLOW PRESCRIBED 
PROCEDURES IN THE ADJUDICATORY PROCEEDINGS. 
Section 63-46b-16(e) provides for relief for a petitioner 
who has been substantially prejudiced by the agency's failure to 
follow prescribed procedures. Rule 861-1-70, Utah Administrative 
Code (1989), provides that "[t]he Commission will accept 
uncontradicted evidence, unless inherently improbable, as being 
true." (A. 37) The Commission's failure to accept 
uncontradicted evidence as true is reviewed as a question of law, 
under the correction of error standard. Morton Internationalf 
163 Utah Adv. Rep. at 37. 
Petitioner has the burden of proving the Board's valuation 
to be incorrect. R861-1-7G, Utah Administrative Code (1989). 
(A. 36) As Rule 861-1-7H, Utah Administrative Code (1989), 
requires, that value must be established by a preponderance of 
the evidence. See Koesling v. Basamakis. 539 P. 2d 1043 (Utah 
1975). To that end, Petitioner introduced credible evidence to 
fix the market value of the property. The evidence in 
Petitioner's appraisal and the testimony of its expert witness 
was uncontradicted. The Tax Commission was required, therefore, 
to assess the property upon Petitioner's appraised market value. 
Petitioner has met the burden of proof on the issue of 
market value of the property with credible evidence of value 
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which must be accepted as true, The Commission's refusal to 
accept the uncontradicted evidence subjected Petitioner to delay, 
possible confiscatory roll-back taxes, and the futile efforts 
required by yet another hearing before the Board. Petitioner's 
appraisal valuation must be accepted as the market value of the 
subject property. 
POINT V 
THE TAX COMMISSION'S FAILURE TO CORRECT THE 
BOARD'S VALUATION AND ASSESSMENT AND REMAND FOR 
FURTHER EVIDENCE DENIES PETITIONER DUE PROCESS, 
IS CONFISCATORY, AND IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL 
AS APPLIED TO THE SUBJECT PROPERTY. 
Judicial review of this issue is governed by Utah Code Ann. 
§ 63-46b-16(4)(a) which permits this Court to grant relief if 
Petitioner has been substantially prejudiced by an agency action 
which is unconstitutional. Interpretations of state and federal 
constitutions by an agency are to be reviewed under a correction 
of error standard, giving no deference to the agency's decision. 
See Savage Industries v. Utah State Tax Commission, 160 Utah Adv. 
Rep. 5, 6 (Utah 1991) . 
The Tax Commission heard credible evidence of the subject 
property's fair market value but refused to correct the Board's 
overassessment. The Commission's assessment of the property 
was based on the authority granted by the legislature in Utah 
Code Ann. § 59-1-210(7): 
The powers and d u t i e s of the Commission a r e as f o l l o w s : 
. . . . 
(7) t o e x e r c i s e g e n e r a l s u p e r v i s i o n o v e r 
a s s e s s o r s and county boards of e q u a l i z a t i o n , and over 
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other county officers in the performance of their 
duties relating to the assessment of property and 
collection of taxes, so that all assessments of 
property are just and equal, according to fair market 
value, and that the tax burden is distributed without 
favor or discrimination; 
• • • • 
(A. 27) 
The Commission has promulgated rules of procedure which 
designate it the State Board of Equalization and permit it to 
correct the valuation of property by County Boards. R861-1-9A, 
Utah Administrative Code (1989). (A. 38) Petitioner contends 
that the Board's unsupported and incorrect valuation and 
assessment and the Commission's failure to correct it results 
in an unconstitutional taking of Petitioner's property without 
due process, in violation of state and federal constitutional 
provisions. 
A. The Proposed Remand Is A Denial Of Due Process. 
The demands of due process arise from a concept of basic 
fairness of procedure. 
"Due process" is not a technical concept that can be 
reduced to a formula with a fixed content unrelated to 
time, place, and circumstances. Rather, "the demands 
of due process rest on the concept of basic fairness of 
procedure and demand a procedure appropriate to the 
case and just to the parties involved. 
Nelson v. Jacobsen, 669 P.2d 1207, 1213 (Utah 1983) quoting Rupp 
v. Grantsville City, 610 P.2d 338, 341 (Utah 1980). In the case 
at bar, Petitioner is denied due process by the Commission's 
remand for further evidence in that the remand sets an impossibly-
high threshold for proof necessary to rebut the Board's 
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valuation. The Commission demands evidence whichf according to 
the testimony of both Petitioner and the Board, cannot be 
obtained. (T. 15, Lines 10-14; T. 58, 62f 63) 
By setting an arbitrary and unreasonably high standard of 
proof, the Commission ensures that Petitioner will be unable to 
obtain sufficient evidence to persuade the Commission of the fair 
market value of the property. Remand is, therefore, futile. The 
Commission's act deprives Petitioner of its property in violation 
of the protections of the Fourteenth Amendment of the Federal 
Constitution and article I, section 7 of the State Constitution. 
B. The Proposed Valuation Is Confiscatory. 
The Commission's refusal to correct the overassessment of 
the property is also unconstitutional. The Board's 1989 
valuation of the property ranges from $40.00 to $53.12 per acre. 
(T. 12) As a result, the proposed tax burden is in excess OJL. the 
total income generated annually from the property's highest and 
best use. Part of the tax in dispute is the amount of any and 
all roll-back taxes. In the event that the property ceases to 
qualify for taxation under the Farmland Assessment Act, § 59-2-
502(1)(a)(i), (A. 33) taxation at the level proposed by the 
Commission would be confiscatory. 
Also in dispute is the difference between the tax claimed 
due by the Board and the tax which would be assessed if the 
property were assessed according to Petitioner's appraised value. 
The Board's valuation of the property was not derived from any 
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appraisal of the property. The County simply adopted the Tax 
Commission's valuation of $50.00 per acre, unsupported by 
credible evidence. (T. 56). That valuation does not satisfy the 
fundamental principle that assessments reflect fair market value 
so that each property is assessed in proportion to the value of 
all property. Utah Code Ann. § 59-1-210(7). (A. 27) 
Assessment at the valuation of $50.00 per acre effectively 
confiscates property determined to be worth only $4.00 per acre. 
The United States Supreme Court has held that the only limitation 
on Congress' power of taxation is where its exercise has been so 
arbitrary as to not constitute a tax but, rather, a confiscation 
of property in violation of the Fifth Amendment. Brushaber v. 
Union Pacific m Co,, 240 U.S.I, 24-25, 36 S.Ct. 236, 60 L.Ed. 
493 (1915). Surely states may not confiscate property by 
arbitrary taxation. 
C. The Proposed Valuation Is Arbitrary And Not Based On Fair 
Market Value. 
Article XIII, section 2 of the Utah Constitution provides 
that "[a]11 tangible property in the state...be taxed in 
proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law." 
(A. 24) Article XIII, section 3 provides: 
The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and 
equal rate of assessment and taxation on all tangible 
property in the state, according to its value in money, 
and shall prescribe by law such regulations as shall 
secure a just valuation for taxation of such property, 
so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
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proportion to the value of his, her or its tangible 
property.... 
(A. 25-26) 
Sections 2 and 3 of Article XIII of the Utah Constitution 
establish the basic state policy that all taxable property bear a 
just proportion of the burden of taxation. Cunningham v. Thomas, 
16 Utah 86, 90, 50 P. 615, 616 (1897). To achieve that 
objective, the market or cash value of all property must be 
ascertained and used as the common denominator for all 
assessments. Kennecott Copper v. Salt Lake County, 799 P.2d 
1156, 1159 (Utah 1990). These approximations of market value 
must present reasonable uniformity. "While absolute equality and 
uniformity in the assessment of property is not practicable, a 
requirement of reasonable uniformity and equality is essential." 
Harmer v. State Tax Commission, 22 Utah 2d 324, 328, 452 P.2d 
876, 879 (1969). 
In Kennecott Copper, the county sought a declaration of this 
Court that the statutory provision for assessment of Petitioner's 
mining property by the "net proceeds formula" resulted in a non-
uniform and unequal rate of taxation not based on the common 
denominator of fair cash value, violating Article XIII, sections 
2 and 3 of the Utah Constitution. This Court held that sections 
2 and 3 of Article XIII applied to the valuation of mining 
property under section 4, stating that any valuation formula must 
be reasonably designed to achieve valuation for assessment and 
taxation, "as near as reasonably practicable equal to the cash 
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price for which the property valued would sell in the open 
market...." Kennecott Copperf 799 P.2d at 1160, quoting 
Cunningham v. Thomas, 16 Utah at 90, 50 P. at 615-616. 
Petitioner in this case seeks an order to the Commission 
requiring it to correct the assessment procedure which allowed 
the Board to adopt the state's unsupported valuation of 
Petitioner's property at $50.00 per acre for assessment and 
taxation purposes. As held in Kennecott Copperf the valuation 
procedure must be designed to achieve uniformity and a fair cash 
value or be unconstitutional. Arguably, the state's arbitrary 
valuation of $50.00 per acre as adopted by the Board provides 
uniformity, but it fails to meet the additional constitutional 
requirement that valuation be based on the property's fair cash 
value. The Commission should be ordered by this Court to correct 
this arbitrary valuation. 
CONCLUSION 
Remand of this case is arbitrary and capricious. For the 
reasons set forth above, Petitioner asks this Court to direct the 
Commission to correct the valuation of Petitioner's property for 
assessment and taxation purposes. 
Respectfully submitted this day of October, 1991. 
Edward M. Bown 
Attorneys for Petitioner 
Uintah Oil Association and 
Utah Oil Shales, Inc. 
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ADDENDUM TO PETITIONER'S BRIEF 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
UTAH OIL SHALES, INC., ) 
Petitioner, ) ORDER 
v. ) 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF ) Appeal Nos. 89-2417 to 
UINTAH COUNTY, : 89-2422 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
: Serial Nos. see attachment 
Respondent. ) 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on October 11, 1990. Joseph G. Linford, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner were 
R. Dennis Ickes, Attorney at Law, Edward M. Bown, Attorney at 
Law, and Steven L. Wiles. Present and representing the 
Respondent was Lorin Merkley, Uintah County Assessor. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The period in question is the lien date 
January 1, 1989. 
3. The subject property consists of 2,278.69 acres 
of vacant land located approximately 65 miles southwest of 
Vernal, Utah. 
Appeal NOS. 89-24x7 tO 89-2422 
4. The market value for the subject property as 
determined by the Uintah County Board of Equalization is 
$113,935. Petitioner requests a market value of $9,000. 
Respondent requests a market value of $113,935. 
5. The subject property has, at the present time, no 
mineral, oil, or mining leases upon it. It was classified 
approximately ten years ago as greenbelt property and has been 
recognized as such by both parties since that time. The 
subject receives no revenues from the production of minerals, 
but only from winter sheep grazing. Petitioner receives at 
least $1,000 per year from the grazing use of the land. There 
is no dispute in this case as to the subject's greenbelt status. 
6. Petitioner submitted an appraisal in support of 
its estimate of market value. The appraisal is performed by 
Petitioner's expert witness, Mr. Wiles, and values the subject 
property at $3.95 to $4.00 per acre. This is based on the 
assumption that the highest and best use for the subject 
property is for winter sheep grazing with little or no present 
potential for mineral production. 
7. Respondent's representative testified that the 
subject property is valued by Respondent according to the value 
established by the state in 1982, which is $50 per square 
acre. He also testified as to several comparable sales of 
significantly smaller tracts of land which sold within a range 
of $40 to $160 per acre, but did not submit any documentary 
support for this testimony. 
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Appeal Nos. 89-2^.7 to 89-2422 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just 
administration of property taxes to ensure that property is 
valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. (Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-210(7).) 
The Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish 
that the market value of the subject property is other than 
that as determined by the Respondent. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The method of analysis utilized in Petitioner's 
appraisal does not conform to the generally accepted practices 
of the appraisal profession and the Commission finds that it is 
insufficient as a reliable indicator of market value. It 
appears that Petitioner's appraisal utilizes contract rents 
instead of economic or market rents. Current market rents for 
similar properties are significantly higher than Petitioner's 
rent figure of $0.96 (ninety-six cents) per AUM. Generally 
accepted appraisal methodology requires that market rents be 
used, rather than contract or actual rents, when it appears 
that the contract rents do not conform to the market. 
The market approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal 
makes adjustments that appear to be very subjective and that 
are difficult to support with reliable market data. Some 
important data elements are not supplied by Petitioner's 
appraisal, such as the actual acreage of its comparable sales 
and the sale dates. It appears that Petitioner's value of 
$3.95 to $4.00 per acre is substantially below market value for 
similar properties in the area. 
Appeal Nos. 89-24i7 to 89-2422 
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, is 
unsupported and utilizes comparable sales with little 
comparability. The Tax Commission finds that since the 
evidence presented by both parties is insufficient to indicate 
a reliable value for the subject property, the matter should be-
remanded to the Uintah County Board of Equalization so that 
each party may have opportunity to correct the deficiencies in 
its case and submit sufficient evidence and analyses for an 
appropriate and accurate value to be determined for the subject 
property. 
The Petitioner is appealing the market value of the 
subject property, and not its value as determined by its 
greenbelt classification under the Farmland Assessment Act 
(FAA). The board of equalization shall, therefore, determine 
the actual market value of the subject property as of the lien 
date, January 1, 1989- Under the law, a board of equalization 
may make a determination regarding the specific level of 
classification to which a property is to be assigned under the 
FAA, e.g., "Graze I," "Graze II," etc., if that issue is on 
appeal to the board, A board of equalization does not, 
however, have authority to make any determination regarding the 
greenbelt values established under each classification. In the 
present case, the Petitioner has not appealed the greenbelt 
classification of the subject property under the FAA, but has 
only appealed the actual market value independent of the 
greenbelt classification. The board of equalization has the 
authority and responsibility to determine the actual fair 
market value. 
Appe al Nos. 89-/ 7 to 89-2422 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission orders that 
the case be remanded for further proceedings before the Uintah 
County Board of Equalization for the submission of additional 
evidence to address the points indicated in this Order. The 
board of equalization is authorized and ordered to be reopened 
for this purpose. It is so ordered, 
DATED this 28 day of ° m ouu>JA J , 1991. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
R/ W. Hansen 
Chairman 
B. Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §S63-46b-13(l), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
JGL/sd/1132w 
-5-
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Appeal Nos. 89-2417 to 89-2422 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed—a. copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Utah Oil Shales, Inc. 
c/o Edward M. Bown 
225 South 200 East, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lorin Merkley 
Uintah County Assessor 
County Courthouse 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Amy G. Pope 
Uintah County Auditor 
County Courthouse 
Vernal, UT 84078 
DATED t h i s 3% day of ^AQA^JL J , 1991. 
Secretary f T \ 
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Appeal'Nos.'89-* 17 to 89-2422 
ATTACHMENT 
APPEAL NUMBER: 89 2417 
APPEAL NUMBERs~89 2418 
APPEAL NUMBER: 89 2419 
APPEAL NUMBER: 89 2420 
APPEAL NUMBER: 89 2421 
APPEAL NUMBER: 89 2422 
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SERIAL NUMBER: 11-024-0001 
SERIAL NUMBER: 11-025-0002 
SERIAL NUMBER: 11-028-0002 
SERIAL NUMBER: 11-029-0001 
SERIAL NUMBER: 11-031-0001 
SERIAL NUMBER: 11-032-0001 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
UINTAH OIL ASSOCIATION, ) 
Petitioner, 
v. ) 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF ) Appeal Nos. 89-2411 to 
UINTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent. ) 
ORDER 
89-2416 
Serial Nos, see attachment 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on October 11, 1990. Joseph G. Linford, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner were 
R. Dennis I ekes, Attorney at Law, Edward M. Bown, Attorney at 
Law, and Steven L. Wiles. Present and representing the 
Respondent was Lorin Merkley, Uintah County Assessor. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The period in question is the lien date 
January 1, 1989. 
3. The subject property consists of 2,038.96 acres 
of vacant land located approximately 65 miles southwest of 
Vernal, Utah. 
Appeal Nos. 89-2*11 to 89-2416 
4. The market value for the subject property as 
determined by the Uintah County Board of Equalization is 
$101,948. Petitioner requests a market value of $8,100. 
Respondent requests a market value of $101,948, 
5. The subject property has, at the present time, no 
mineral, oil, or mining leases upon it. It was classified 
approximately ten years ago as greenbelt property and has been 
recognized as such by both parties since that time. The 
subject receives no revenues from the production of minerals, 
but only from winter sheep grazing. Petitioner receives at 
least $1,000 per year from the grazing use of the land. There 
is no dispute in this case as to the subject's greenbelt status. 
6. Petitioner submitted an appraisal in support of 
its estimate of market value. The appraisal is performed by 
Petitioner's expert witness, Mr. Wiles, and values the subject 
property at $3.95 to $4.00 per acre. This is based on the 
assumption that the highest and best use for the subject 
property is for winter sheep grazing with little or no present 
potential for mineral production. 
7. Respondent's representative testified that the 
subject property is valued by Respondent according to the value 
established by the state in 1982, which is $50 per acre. He 
also testified as to several comparable sales of significantly 
smaller tracts of land which sold within a range of $40 to $160 
per acre, but did not submit any documentary support for this 
testimony. 
-2-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just 
administration of property taxes to ensure that property is 
valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. (Utah 
Code Ann. S3S-1-210(7).) 
The Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish 
that the market value of the subject property is other than 
that as determined by the Respondent. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The method of analysis utilized in Petitioner's 
appraisal does not conform to the generally accepted practices 
of the appraisal profession and the Commission finds that it is 
insufficient as a reliable indicator of market value. It 
appears that Petitioner's appraisal utilizes contract rents 
instead of economic or market rents. Current market rents for 
similar properties are significantly higher than Petitioner's 
rent figure of $0.96 (ninety-six cents) per AUM. Generally 
accepted appraisal methodology requires that market rents be 
used, rather than contract or actual rents, when it appears 
that the contract rents do not conform to the market. 
The market approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal 
makes adjustments that appear to be very subjective and that 
are difficult to support with reliable market data. Some 
important data elements are not supplied by Petitioner's 
appraisal, such as the actual acreage of its comparable sales 
and the sale dates. It appears that Petitioner's value of 
$3.95 to $4.00 per acre is substantially below market value for 
similar properties in the area. 
-3-
Appeal Nos. 89-?4Il to 89-2416 
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, is 
unsupported and utilizes comparable sales with little 
comparability. The Tax Commission finds that since the 
evidence presented by both parties is insufficient to indicate 
a reliable value for the subject property, the matter should be 
remanded to the Uintah County Board of Equalization so that 
each party may have opportunity to correct the deficiencies in 
its case and submit sufficient evidence and analyses for an 
appropriate and accurate value to be determined for the subject 
property. 
The Petitioner is appealing the market value of the 
subject property, and not its value as determined by its 
greenbelt classification under the Farmland Assessment Act 
(FAA). The board of equalization shall, therefore, determine 
the actual market value of the subject property as of the lien 
date, January 1, 1989. Under the law, a board of equalization 
may make a determination regarding the specific level of 
classification to which a property is to be assigned under the 
FAA, e.g., "Graze I," "Graze II," etc., if that issue is on 
appeal to the board. A board of equalization does not, 
however, have authority to make any determination regarding the 
greenbelt values established under each classification. In the 
present case, the Petitioner has not appealed the greenbelt 
classification of the subject property under the FAA, but has 
only appealed the actual market value independent of the 
greenbelt classification. The board of equalization has the 
authority and responsibility to determine the actual fair 
market value. 
Appeal Nos. 89-2 1 to 89-2416 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission orders that 
the case be remanded for further proceedings before the Uintah 
County Board of Equalization for the submission of additional 
evidence to address the points indicated in this Order, The 
board of equalization is authorized and ordered to be reopened 
for this purpose. It is so ordered. 
DATED this 23 day of 1991. 
BYJiRDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
iansen 
Chairman 
Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(l), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
JGL/sd/1133w 
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Appeal Nos. 89-2411 to 89-2416 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Uintah Oil Association 
c/o Edward M. Bown 
225 South 200 East, Suite 150 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lorin Merkley 
Uintah County Assessor 
County Courthouse 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Amy G. Pope 
Uintah County Auditor 
County Courthouse 
Vernal, UT 84078 
DATED this £ ft day of ^ 7 \ Q A A ^ ~ , 1991 O ^ J L , 
'Secretary AT^ 
I 
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ATTACHMENT 
APPEAL 
APPEAL 
APPEAL 
APPEAL 
APPEAL 
APPEAL 
NUMBER 
NUMBER 
NUMBER 
NUMBER 
NUMBER 
NUMBER 
89 
89 
89 
89 
89 
89 
2411 
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2414 
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2416 
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SERIAL NUMBER: 11-025-0001 
SERIAL NUMBER: ll-026-Q0J)l 
SERIAL NUMBER: 11-027-0001 
SERIAL NUMBER: 11-028-0001 
SERIAL NUMBER: 10-093-0001 
SERIAL NUMBER: 10-094-0001 
BEFORE THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION 
UTAH SHALE LAND & ) 
MINERALS CORP., 
Petitioner, ) ORDER 
v. ) 
COUNTY BOARD OF EQUALIZATION OF ) Appeal Nos. 89-2374 to 
UINTAH COUNTY, 
STATE OF UTAH, ) 
Respondent. ) 
89-2410 
Serial Nos. see attached 
STATEMENT OF CASE 
This matter came before the Utah State Tax Commission 
for a formal hearing on October 11, 1990. Joseph G. Linford, 
Presiding Officer, heard the matter for and on behalf of the 
Commission. Present and representing the Petitioner were 
R. Dennis Ickes, Attorney at Law, Edward M. Bown, Attorney at 
Law, and Steven L. Wiles. Present and representing the 
Respondent was Lorin Merkley, Uintah County Assessor. 
Based upon the evidence and testimony presented at the 
hearing, the Tax Commission hereby makes its: 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. The tax in question is property tax. 
2. The period in question is the lien date 
January 1, 1989. 
3. The subject property consists of 19,200.52 acres 
of vacant land located approximately 65 miles southwest of 
Vernal, Utah. 
Appeal Nos. 89-7 ^4 to 89-2410 
4. The market value for the subject property as 
determined by the Uintah County Board of Equalization is 
$960,026. Petitioner requests a market value of $75,400. 
Respondent requests a market value of $960,026. 
iTr The subject property has, at the present time, no 
mineral, oil, or mining leases upon it. It was classified 
approximately ten years ago as greenbelt property and has been 
recognized as such by both parties since that time. The 
subject receives no revenues from the production of minerals, 
but only from winter sheep grazing. Petitioner receives at 
least $1,000 per year from the grazing use of the land. There 
is no dispute in this case as to the subject's greenbelt status. 
6. Petitioner submitted an appraisal in support of 
its estimate of market value. The appraisal is performed by 
Petitioner's expert witness, Mr. Wiles, and values the subject 
property at $3.95 to $4.00 per acre. This is based on the 
assumption that the highest and best use for the subject 
property is for winter sheep grazing with little or no present 
potential for mineral production. 
7. Respondent's representative testified that the 
subject property is valued by Respondent according to the value 
established by the state in 1982, which is $50 per acre. He 
also testified as to several comparable sales of significantly 
smaller tracts of land which sold within a range of $40 to $160 
per acre, but did not submit any documentary support for this 
testimony. 
-2-
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
The Tax Commission is required to oversee the just 
administration of property taxes to ensure that property is 
valued for tax purposes according to fair market value. (Utah 
Code Ann. §59-1-210(7).) 
The Petitioner has the burden of proof to establish 
that the market value of the subject property is other than 
that as determined by the Respondent. 
DECISION AND ORDER 
The method of analysis utilized in Petitioner's 
appraisal does not conform to the generally accepted practices 
of the appraisal profession and the Commission finds that it is 
insufficient as a reliable indicator of market value. It 
appears that Petitioner's appraisal utilizes contract rents 
instead of economic or market rents. Current market rents for 
similar properties are significantly higher than Petitioner's 
rent figure of $0.96 (ninety-six cents) per AUM. Generally 
accepted appraisal methodology requires that market rents be 
used, rather than contract or actual rents, when it appears 
that the contract rents do not conform to the market. 
The market approach to value in Petitioner's appraisal 
makes adjustments that appear to be very subjective and that 
are difficult to support with reliable market data. Some 
important data elements are not supplied by Petitioner's 
appraisal, such as the actual acreage of its comparable sales 
and the sale dates. It appears that Petitioner's value of 
$3.95 to $4.00 per acre is substantially below market value for 
similar properties in the area. 
Appeal Nos. 89-2 4 to 89-2410 
Respondent's evidence, on the other hand, is 
unsupported and utilizes comparable sales with little 
comparability. The Tax Commission finds that since the 
evidence presented by both parties is insufficient to indicate 
a reliable value for the subject property, the matter should be 
remanded to the Uintah County Board of Equalization so that 
each party may have opportunity to correct the deficiencies in 
its case and submit sufficient evidence and analyses for an 
appropriate and accurate value to be determined for the subject 
property. 
The Petitioner is appealing the market value of the 
subject property, and not its value as determined by its 
greenbelt classification under the Farmland Assessment Act 
(FAA). The board of equalization shall, therefore, determine 
the actual market value of the subject property as of the lien 
date, January 1, 1989. Under the law, a board of equalization 
may make a determination regarding the specific level of 
classification to which a property is to be assigned under the 
FAA, e.g., "Graze I," "Graze II," etc., if that issue is on 
appeal to the board. A board of equalization does not, 
however, have authority to make any determination regarding the 
greenbelt values established under each classification. In the 
present case, the Petitioner has not appealed the greenbelt 
classification of the subject property under the FAA, but has 
only appealed the actual market value independent of the 
greenbelt classification. The board of equalization has the 
authority and responsibility to determine the actual fair 
market value. 
Appeal Nos. 89-2^4 to 89-2410 
Based upon the foregoing, the Tax Commission orders that 
the case be remanded for further proceedings before the Uintah 
County Board of Equalization for the submission of additional 
evidence to address the points indicated in this Order. The 
board of equalization is authorized and ordered to be reopened 
for this purpose. It is so ordered. 
DATED this £ 8 day of 1991. 
BY ORDER OF THE UTAH STATE TAX COMMISSION. 
Toe B, Pacheco 
Commissioner 
G. Blaine Davis 
Commissioner 
NOTICE: You have twenty (20) days after the date of the final 
order to file a request for reconsideration or thirty (30) days 
after the date of final order to file in Supreme Court a 
petition for judicial review. Utah Code Ann. §§63-46b-13(l), 
63-46b-14(2)(a). 
JGL/sd/1130w 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a copy of the foregoing 
Decision to the following: 
Utah Shale Land & Minerals Corp. 
c/o Nielsen & Senior - R. Dennis Ickes 
1100 Eagle Gate Plaza 
60 East South Temple 
Salt Lake City, UT 84111 
Lorin Merkley 
Uintah County Assessor 
County Courthouse 
Vernal, UT 84078 
Amy G. Pope 
Uintah County Auditor 
County Courthouse 
Vernal, UT 84078 
DATED this £8 day of n\ouxJ^^ , 1991. 
^Secretary ^~Y\ 
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STATES CONSTITUTION, Fourteenth Amendment, 
AMENDMENT 14 
Section 1. Citizens of the United States. 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and subject to the 
jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the United States and of the State 
wherein they reside. No State shall make or enforce any law which shall 
abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor 
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due 
process of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal 
protection of the laws. 
Sec. 2. Representatives—Power to reduce apportionment. 
Representatives shall be apportioned among the several States according to 
their respective numbers, counting the whole number of persons in each 
State, excluding Indians not taxed. But when the right to vote at any 
election for the choice of electors for President and Vice-President of the 
United States, Representatives in Congress, the Executive and Judicial 
officers of a State, or the members of the Legislature thereof, is denied to 
any of the male inhabitants of such State, being twenty-one years of age, 
and citizens of the United States, or in any way abridged, except for 
participation in rebellion, or other crime, the basis of representation therein 
shall be reduced in the proportion which the number of such male citizens 
shall bear to the whole number of male citizens twenty-one years of age in 
such State. 
Sec. 3. Disqualification to hold office. 
No person shall be a Senator or Representative in Congress, or Elector of 
President and Vice-President, or hold any office, civil or military, under the 
United States, or under any State, who, having previously taken an oath, 
as a member of Congress, or as an officer of the United States, or as a 
member of any State legislature, or as an executive or judicial officer of any 
State, to support the Constitution of the United States, shall have engaged 
in insurrection or rebellion against the same, or given aid or comfort to the 
enemies thereof. But Congress may by a vote of two-thirds of each House, 
remove such disability. 
Sec. 4. Public debt not to be questioned—Debts of the Confeder-
acy and claims not to be paid. 
The validity of the public debt of the United States, authorized by law, 
including debts incurred for payment of pensions and bounties for services 
in suppressing insurrection or rebellion, shall not be questioned. But 
neither the United States nor any State shall assume or pay any debt or 
10 
DUE PROCESS; EQUAL PROTECTION Amend 14 
obligation incurred in aid of insurrection or rebellion against the United 
States, or any claim for the loss or emancipation of any slaves; but all such 
debts, obligations, and claims shall be held illegal and void. 
Sec. 5. Power to enforce amendment. 
The Congress shall have power to enforce, by appropriate legislation, the 
provisions of this article. 
11 
STATE CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 2 
Sec. 2. [Tangible property to be taxed — Value ascer-
tained — Exemptions — Remittance or abate-
ment of taxes of poor — Intangible property — 
Legislature to provide annual tax for state.] 
(1) All tangible property in the state, not exempt under the laws of the 
United States, or under this Constitution, shall be taxed at a uniform and 
equal rate in proportion to its value, to be ascertained as provided by law. 
(2) The following are property tax exemptions: 
(a) The property of the state, school districts, and public libraries; 
(b) The property of counties, cities, towns, special districts, and all 
other political subdivisions of the state, except that to the extent and in 
the manner provided by the Legislature the property of a county, city, 
town, special district or other political subdivision of the state located 
outside of its geographic boundaries as defined by law may be subject to 
the ad valorem property tax; 
(c) Property owned by a nonprofit entity which is used exclusively for 
religious, charitable or educational purposes; 
(d) Places of burial not held or used for private or corporate benefit; and 
(e) Farm equipment and farm machinery as defined by statute. This 
exemption shall be implemented over a period of time as provided by 
statute. 
(3) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., which is 
held for sale or processing and which is shipped to final destination outside 
this state within twelve months may be deemed by law to have acquired no 
situs in Utah for purposes of ad valorem property taxation and may be ex-
empted by law from such taxation, whether manufactured, processed or pro-
duced or otherwise originating within or without the state. 
(4) Tangible personal property present in Utah on January 1, m., held for 
sale in the ordinary course of business and which constitutes the inventory of 
any retailer, or wholesaler or manufacturer or farmer, or livestock raiser may 
be deemed for purposes of ad valorem property taxation to be exempted. 
(5) Water rights, ditches, canals, reservoirs, power plants, pumping plants, 
transmission lines, pipes and flumes owned and used by individuals or corpo-
rations for irrigating land within the state owned by such individuals or 
corporations, or the individual members thereof, shall be exempted from taxa-
tion to the extent that they shall be owned and used for such purposes. 
(6) Power plants, power transmission lines and other property used for 
generating and delivering electrical power, a portion of which is used for 
furnishing power for pumping water for irrigation purposes on lands in the 
state of Utah, may be exempted from taxation to the extent that such property 
is used for such purposes. These exemptions shall accrue to the benefit of the 
users of water so pumped under such regulations as the Legislature may 
prescribe. 
(7) The taxes of the poor may be remitted or abated at such times and in 
such manner as may be provided by law. 
(8) The Legislature may provide by law for the exemption from taxation: of 
not to exceed 45% of the fair market value of residential property as defined 
by law; and all household furnishings, furniture, and equipment used exclu-
sively by the owner thereof at his place of abode in maintaining a home for 
himself and family. 
(9) Property owned by disabled persons who served in any war in the mili-
tary service of the United States or of the state of Utah and by the unmarried 
widows and minor orphans of such disabled persons or of persons who while 
serving in the military service of the United States or the state of Utah were 
killed in action or died as a result of such service may be exempted as the 
Legislature may provide. 
(10) Intangible property may be exempted from taxation as property or it 
may be taxed as property in such manner and to such extent as the Legisla-
ture may provide, but if taxed as property the income therefrom shall not also 
be taxed. Provided that if intangible property is taxed as property the rate 
thereof shall not exceed five mills on each dollar of valuation. 
(11) The Legislature shall provide by law for an annual tax sufficient, with 
other sources of revenue, to defray the estimated ordinary expenses of the 
state for each fiscal year. For the purpose of paying the state debt, if any there 
be, the Legislature shall provide for levying a tax annually, sufficient to pay 
the annual interest and to pay the principal of such debt, within twenty years 
from the final passage of the law creating the debt. 
History: Const. 1896; L. 1930 (Spec. Sess.), County service area property exempt, 
S.J.R. 2; 1945, H.J.R. 3; 1957, H.J.R. 7; 1961, § 17A-2-429. 
S.J.R. 6; 1963, S.J.R. 5; 1967, S.J.R. 1; 1982, Disabled veteran's exemption, §§ 59-2-1104, 
S.J.R. 3; 1986, H.J.R. 18. 59-2-1105. 
Compiler's Notes. — Laws 1959, Senate Exemptions generally, § 59-2-1101 et seq., 
Joint Resolution No. 5 proposed a constitu- Chapter 23 of Title 78 
tional amendment to be voted oa by the elec- i n d i gent persons, abatement or deferral of 
tors at the general election in 1960. The pro-
 t a x e s > § § 59_2_ii07 to 59-2-1109. 
posed amendment failed to pass because it did
 I n d u s t r i a l facilities development property 
not receive the necessary majority. t 8 n 17 10 
The 1979 proposed amendments to this sec- *#• j . . " , . . 
tion by House Joint Resolutions Nos. 23 and 25
 u
M m e a n d m m
'
n g c l a i m i m p r o ? T 2 ? * T f 
were repealed and withdrawn by Senate Joint ch™1T1 ° r s t r u c t u r e s n o t exemP*> § 5 9 " 5 - 6 4 ' 
Resolution No. 6, Laws 1980. Privilege tax on possession and use of tax-
Laws 1986, Senate Joint Resolution No. 4, e x e m P t properties, § 51-4-101. 
proposed to amend Subsection (2)(c) of this sec- Property of higher education institutions ex-
tion. The proposed amendment was submitted empt, § 53B-20-106. 
to the electors at the general election in 1986 Property tax relief, § 59-2-1201 et seq. 
and failed to pass because it did not receive the Rate of assessment of property, § 59-2-103. 
necessary majority. School property exempt from taxation, 
Cross-References. — Armories exempt § 53A-3-408. 
from taxation, § 39-2-1. Tangible personal property held for sale on 
Civil Air Patrol equipment exempt, § 2-1-41. January 1 exempt, § 59-2-1114. 
UTAH STATE CONSTITUTION, Article XIII, Section 3 
Sec, 3. [Assessment and taxation of tangible property — 
Livestock — Land used for agricultural pur-
poses.] 
(1) The Legislature shall provide by law a uniform and equal rate of assess-
ment on all tangible property in the state, according to its value in money, 
except as otherwise provided in Section 2 of this Article. The Legislature shall 
prescribe by law such provisions as shall secure a just valuation for taxation 
of such property, so that every person and corporation shall pay a tax in 
proportion to the value of his, her, or its tangible property, provided that the 
Legislature may determine the manner and extent of taxing livestock. 
(2) Land used for agricultural purposes may, as the Legislature prescribes, 
be assessed according to its value for agricultural use without regard to the 
value it may have for other purposes. 
History: Const. 1896; Nov. 6, 1900; Nov. 6, 
1906; L. 1930 (S.S.), S.J.R. 2; 1946 (1st S.S.), 
H.J.R. 2; 1967, S.J.R. 2; 1982, S.J.R. 3. 
Compiler's Notes. — The 1979 proposed 
amendment of this section by House Joint Res-
ANALYSIS 
In general. 
"According to value in money" construed. 
Charitable association. 
Co-operative corporation property. 
County clerk's probate fees. 
County improvement district contingent tax. 
Disparity in state and county assessment. 
Double taxation. 
Drainage assessments. 
olution No. 23 was repealed and withdrawn by 
Senate Joint Resolution No. 6, Laws 1980. 
Cross-References. — Uniform School 
Fund, taxes allocated to, § 53A-16-101. 
Occupation and license taxes. 
Remission of taxes of indigent or insane per-
sons. 
Road poll taxes. 
Roll-back of assessed value. 
Special assessments. 
State property. 
Telephone license tax. 
Uniformity and equality. 
Utility rates. 
Cited. 
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59-1-210. General powers and duties. 
The powers and duties of the commission are as follows: 
(1) to sue and be sued in its own name; 
(2) to adopt rules and policies consistent with the Constitution and 
laws of this state to govern the commission, executive director, division 
directors, and commission employees in the performance of their duties; 
(3) to adopt rules and policies consistent with the Constitution and 
laws of the state, to govern county boards and officers in the performance 
of any duty relating to assessment, equalization, and collection of taxes; 
(4) to prescribe the use of forms relating to the assessment of property 
for state or local taxation, the equalization of those assessments, the 
reporting of property or income for state or local taxation purposes, or for 
the computation of those taxes and the reporting of any information, 
statistics, or data required by the commission; 
(5) to administer and supervise the tax laws of the state; 
(6) to prepare and maintain from year to year a complete record of all 
lands subject to taxation in this state, and all machinery used in mining 
and all property or surface improvements upon or appurtenant to mines 
or mining claims; 
(7) to exercise general supervision over assessors and county boards of 
equalization, and over other county officers in the performance of their 
duties relating to the assessment of property and collection of taxes, so 
that all assessments of property are just and equal, according to fair 
market value, and that the tax burden is distributed without favor or 
discrimination; 
(8) to reconvene any county board of equalization which, when recon-
vened, may only address business approved by the commission and extend 
the time for which any county board of equalization may sit for the equal-
ization of assessments; 
(9) to confer with, advise, and direct county treasurers, assessors, and 
other county officers in matters relating to the assessment and equaliza-
tion of property for taxation and the collection of taxes; 
(10) to provide for and hold annually at such time and place as may be 
convenient a district or state convention of county assessors, auditors, and 
other county officers to consider and discuss matters relative to taxation, 
uniformity of valuation, and changes in the law relative to taxation and 
methods of assessment, to which county assessors and other officers called 
to attend shall attend at county expense; 
(11) to direct proceedings, actions, and prosecutions to enforce the laws 
relating to the penalties, liabilities, and punishments of public officers, 
persons, and officers or agents or corporations for failure or neglect to 
comply with the statutes governing the reporting, assessment, and taxa-
tion of property; 
(12) to cause complaints to be made in the proper court seeking re-
moval from office of assessors, auditors, members of county boards, and 
other assessing, taxing, or disbursing officers, who are guilty of official 
misconduct or neglect of duty; 
(13) to require county attorneys to immediately institute and prosecute 
actions and proceedings in respect to penalties, forfeitures, removals, and 
punishments for violations of the laws relating to the assessment and 
taxation of property in their respective counties; 
(14) to require any person to furnish any information required by the 
commission to ascertain the value and the relative burden borne by all 
kinds of property in the state, and to require from all state and local 
officers any information necessary for the proper discharge of the duties 
of the commission; 
(15) to examine all records relating to the valuation of property of any 
person; 
(16) to subpoena witnesses to appear and give testimony and produce 
records relating to any matter before the commission; 
(17) to cause depositions of eyewitnesses to be taken as in civil actions 
at the request of the commission or any party to any matter or proceeding 
before the commission; 
(18) to authorize any member or employee of the commission to admin-
ister oaths and affirmations in any matter or proceeding relating to the 
exercise of the powers and duties of the commission; 
(19) to visit periodically each county of the state, to investigate and 
direct the work and methods of local assessors and other officials in the 
assessment, equalization, and taxation of property, and to ascertain 
whether the law requiring the assessment of all property not exempt from 
taxation, and the collection of taxes, have been properly administered and 
enforced; 
(20) to carefully examine all cases where evasion or violation of the 
laws for assessment and taxation of property is alleged, to ascertain 
whether existing laws are defective or improperly administered; 
(21) to furnish to the governor from time to time such assistance and 
information as the governor requires; 
(22) to transmit to the governor and to each member of the Legislature 
recommendations as to legislation which will correct or eliminate defects 
in the operation of the tax laws and will equalize the burden of taxation 
within the state; 
(23) to correct any error in any assessment made by it at any time 
before the tax is due and report the correction to the county auditor, who 
shall enter the corrected assessment upon the assessment roll; 
(24) to compile and publish statistics relating to taxation in the state 
and prepare and submit an annual budget to the governor for inclusion in 
the state budget to be submitted to the Legislature; 
(25) to perform any further duties imposed by law, and exercise all 
powers necessary in the performance of its duties; 
(26) to adopt a schedule of fees assessed for services provided by the 
commission, unless otherwise provided by statute. The fee shall be rea-
sonable and fair, and shall reflect the cost of services provided. Each fee 
established in this manner shall be submitted to and approved by the 
Legislature as part of the commission's annual appropriations request. 
The commission may not charge or collect any fee proposed in this man-
ner without approval by the Legislature; and 
(27) to comply with the procedures and requirements of Chapter 46b, 
Title 63, in its adjudicative proceedings. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 4, § 308 
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987. 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 4, § 307 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987, except for 
Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205, and 59-2-207, 
which take effect January 1, 1988." 
Cross-References. — Constitutional duties, 
Const. Art. Xm, § 11. 
Increase or lowering of assessments, 
§ 59-2-1014. 
Uniform system of accounts, § 59-1-211. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
ANALYSIS 
Actions by and against commission. 
Appeals. 
—"Informal" hearing. 
Assessments. 
Changing valuation of property. 
Contempt power. 
Duties. 
Equalization of assessments. 
Legality of tax. 
Liability of commission. 
Local assessments. 
Violation of tax law. 
Actions by and against commission. 
Under Subsection (1), the State Tax Com-
mission may sue in its own name for collection 
of taxes, such as the sales tax. State Tax 
Comm'n v. City of Logan, 88 Utah 406, 54 P.2d 
1197 (1936). 
Appeals. 
The State Tax Commission has more than 
mere administrative duties; it is also clothed 
with quasi-judicial duties and functions, and 
hence is subject in proper cases to review of its 
decisions by certiorari, where such decision, 
ruling or order materially affects the substan-
tial rights of the applicant for the writ, and 
was made because of a wrong interpretation of 
the law or a failure to follow or apply the law, 
or where it is against the undisputed evidence, 
provided always there is no plain, speedy, and 
adequate remedy in the ordinary course of the 
law. Board of Equalization v. State Tax 
History: C. 1953, 59-1-210, enacted by L. 
1987, ch. 4, § 36; 1987, ch. 161, § 210. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment by Chapter 161, effective January 1, 
1988, added Subsection (27). 
Compiler's Notes. — Former § 59-5-46, as 
last amended by Laws 1984 (2nd S.S.), ch. 15, 
§ 19, contained provisions similar to this sec-
tion. Laws 1987, ch. 161, § 220 purported to 
amend former § 59-5-46, effective January 1, 
1988, but the amendment could not be given 
effect because the prior repeal of § 59-5-46 by 
Laws 1987. ch. 4, § 306. 
Comm'n, 88 Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418, rehearing 
denied, 88 Utah 228, 54 P.2d 1214 (1935). 
—"Informal" hearing. 
Even though commission's Code of Adminis-
trative Procedure provided for "informal" and 
then "formal" hearing on tax questions, tax-
payer's failure to apply for formal hearing be-
fore taking appeal to Supreme Court from "de-
cision" at informal hearing was not improper; 
statutory provisions and other rules in Code 
justify procedure followed by taxpayer. Nelson 
v. State Tax Comm'n, 29 Utah2d 162, 506 P.2d 
437, afTd, 532 P.2d 680 (Utah 1973). 
Assessments. 
Tax commission may cancel, change or va-
cate an assessment upon proper showing. 
Board of Equalization v. State Tax Comm'n, 88 
Utah 219, 50 P.2d 418, rehearing denied, 88 
Utah 228, 54 P.2d 1214 (1935). 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
59-2-102. Definitions. 
As used in this chapter and title: ^noeTY,onf nf 
(1) "Assessment roll" means a permanent record of the assessment of 
property as assessed by the county assessor and the c o m m l n S f X ^ e 3 
be maintained manually or as a computerized file as a corLSolxdated recor^ 
or as multiple records by type, classification, or categories. A * ? ™ " * 
roll" includes assessment books, assessment lists, assessors lists, ana 
other such materials. , . , . , „,_„IJ 
(2) "Fair market value" means the amount at which P r o P ^ ^ n J 
change hands between a willing buyer and a willing seller, wittier being 
under any compulsion to buy or sell and both having reasonable knowl-
edge of the relevant facts. ,. 
(3) "Farm machinery and equipment," for purposes of the exemption 
provided under Subsection 59-2-1101(1X0, means tractors, milking equip-
ment and storage and cooling facilities, feed handling equipment, irriga-
tion equipment, harvesters, choppers, grain drills and planters, tillage 
tools, scales, combines, spreaders, sprayers, haying equipment, and any 
other machinery or equipment used primarily for agricultural purposes; 
but does not include vehicles required to be registered with the Depart-
ment of Motor Vehicles or vehicles or other equipment used for business 
purposes other than farming. 
(4) "Improvements" includes all buildings, structures, fixtures, fences, 
and improvements erected upon or affixed to the land, whether the title 
has been acquired to the land or not. "Improvements" also includes a 
mobile home as defined in § 59-2-601, located on land owned by the per-
son who owns the mobile home. For purposes of this subsection "land 
owned" includes a vendee in possession of the land under a land contract. 
(5) "Metalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to, gold, silver, 
copper, lead, zinc, and uranium. 
(6) "Mine" means a natural deposit of either metalliferous or 
nonmetalliferous valuable mineral. 
(7) "Mining" means the process of producing, extracting, leaching, 
evaporating, or otherwise removing a mineral from a mine. 
(8) "Nonmetalliferous minerals" includes, but is not limited to, oil, gas, 
coal, salts, sand, rock, gravel, and all carboniferous materials. 
(9) "Personal property" includes: 
(a) every class of property as defined in Subsection (9) [Subsection 
(10)] which is the subject of ownership and not included within the 
meaning of the terms "real estate" and "improvements"; 
(b) gas and water mains and pipes laid in roads, streets, or alleys; 
(c) bridges and ferries; and 
(d) livestock which, for the purposes of the exemption provided 
under § 59-2-1111, means all domestic animals, honeybees, poultry, 
fur-bearing animals, and fish. 
(10) "Property" means property which is subject to assessment and 
taxation according to its value, but does not include moneys, credits, 
bonds, stocks, representative property, franchises, goodwill, copyrights, 
patents, or other intangibles. 
(11) "Public utility," for purposes of this chapter, means the operating 
property of a railroad, common carrier, gas corporation, oil or gas trans-
portation or pipeline company, coal slurry pipeline company, electrical 
corporation, telephone corporation, sewerage corporation, or heat corpora-
tion where the company performs the service for, or delivers the commod-
ity to, the public generally or companies serving the public generally, or 
in the case of gas corporation or electrical corporation, where the gas or 
electricity is sold or furnished to any member or consumers within the 
state for domestic, commercial, or industrial use. Public utility also 
means the operating property of any entity or person defined under 
§ 54-2-1 except warehousemen and water corporations. 
(12) "Real estate" includes: 
(a) the possession of, claim to, ownership of, or right to the posses-
sion of, land; 
(b) all mines, minerals, and quarries in and under the land, all 
timber belonging to individuals or corporations growing or being on 
the lands of this state or the United States, and all rights and privi-
leges appertaining thereto; and 
(c) improvements. 
(13) "Residential property," for the purposes of the reductions and ad-
justments under this chapter, means any property used for residential 
purposes as a primary residence. It does not include property used for 
transient residential use or condominiums used in rental pools. 
(14) "Tax roll" means a permanent record of the taxes charged on prop-
erty, as extended on the assessment roll, and may be maintained on the 
same record or records as the assessment roll or may be maintained on a 
separate record properly indexed to the assessment roll. "Tax roll" in-
cludes tax books, tax lists, and other such materials. 
History: C. 1953, 59-2-102, enacted by L. Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
1987, ch. 4, § 49; 1987, ch. 93, § 1.
 ch. 4, § 307, provides: "This act has retrospec-
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
 tive operation to January 1, 1987, except for 
ment by Chapter 93, effective April 27, 1987 Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205, and 59-2-207, 
added present Subsection (3) and redesignated
 w h k h ^ e f f e c t J a ± 1 9 g 8 „ 
former Subsections (3) through (13) as present
 T 100f7 , n o R 0 . , «<„«. . 
Subsections (4) through (14).
 u
 L a w s 1 9 8 7> c h ' 93> § 3 . P r ™ d e s ; ^ « ? 
Compiler's Notes. — Former § 59-3-1, as h a s retrospective operation to January 1, 
amended by Laws 1986, ch. 57, § 26 contained 1987." 
provisions similar to this section. Cross-References. — Railroad rolling stock 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 4, § 308 as personalty, Utah Const. Art. XII, § 14. 
makes the act effective on February 6, 1987. 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
"Real estate." are included in term "real estate." Mammoth 
An engine and boiler built into a brick foun- Mining Co. v. Juab County, 10 Utah 232, 37 P. 
dation and firmly affixed by bolts leaded down 348 (1894). 
and used in underground workings of a mine 
COLLATERAL REFERENCES 
Brigham Young Law Review. — Software C.J.S. — 84 C.J.S. Taxation § 66. 
Taxation: A Critical Reevaluation of the No- Key Numbers. — Taxation <*= 58. 
tion of Intangibility, 1980 B.Y.U. L. Rev. 859. 
Am. Jur. 2d. — 71 Am. Jur. 2d State and 
Local Taxation §§ 1, 2. 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
59-2-502. Definitions. 
As used in this part: 
(1) "Land in agricultural use" means: 
(a) land devoted to the raising of useful plants and animals, such 
as: 
(i) forages and sod crops; 
(ii) grains and feed crops; 
(iii) livestock as defined in Subsection 59-2-102 (8)(d) [Subsec-
tion 59-2-102(9)(d)]; 
(iv) trees and fruits; or 
(v) vegetables, nursery, floral, and ornamental stock; or 
(b) land devoted to and meeting the requirements and qualifica-
tions or payments or other compensation under a crop-land retire-
ment program with an agency of the state or federal government. 
(2) "Roll-back" means the period preceding the withdrawal of the land 
from the provisions of this part or the change in use of the land, not to 
exceed five years, during which the land is valued, assessed, and taxed 
under this part. 
History: C. 1953, 59-5-88, enacted by L. 
1969, ch. 180, § 3; renumbered by L. 1987, 
ch. 4, § 104. 
Amendment Notes. — The 1987 amend-
ment, effective February 6, 1987, renumbered 
this section which was formerly § 59-5-88 and 
rewrote the section, adding Subsection (2). 
Retrospective Operation. — Laws 1987, 
ch. 4, § 307 provides: "This act has retrospec-
tive operation to January 1, 1987, except for 
Sections 59-2-201, 59-2-205, and 59-2-207, 
which take effect January 1, 1988." 
UTAH CODE ANNOTATED 
63-46b-16. Judicial review — Formal adjudicative pro-
ceedings. 
(1) As provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Court of Appeals has 
jurisdiction to review all final agency action resulting from formal adjudica-
tive proceedings. 
(2) (a) To seek judicial review of final agency action resulting from formal 
adjudicative proceedings, the petitioner shall file a petition for review of 
agency action with the appropriate appellate court in the form required 
by the appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court. 
(b) The appellate rules of the appropriate appellate court shall govern 
all additional filings and proceedings in the appellate court. 
(3) The contents, transmittal, and filing of the agency's record for judicial 
review of formal adjudicative proceedings are governed by the Utah Rules of 
Appellate Procedure, except that: 
(a) all parties to the review proceedings may stipulate to shorten, sum-
marize, or organize the record; 
(b) the appellate court may tax the cost of preparing transcripts and 
copies for the record: 
(i) against a party who unreasonably refuses to stipulate to 
shorten, summarize, or organize the record; or 
(ii) according to any other provision of law. 
(4) The appellate court shall grant relief only if, on the basis of the agency's 
record, it determines that a person seeking judicial review has been substan-
tially prejudiced by any of the following: 
(a) the agency action, or the statute or rule on which the agency action 
is based, is unconstitutional on its face or as applied; 
(b) the agency has acted beyond the jurisdiction conferred by any stat-
ute; 
(c) the agency has not decided all of the issues requiring resolution; 
(d) the agency has erroneously interpreted or applied the law; 
(e) the agency has engaged in an unlawful procedure or decision-mak-
ing process, or has failed to follow prescribed procedure; 
736 
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(f) the persons taking the agency action were illegally constituted as a 
decision-making body or were subject to disqualification; 
(g) the agency action is based upon a determination of fact, made or 
implied by the agency, that is not supported by substantial evidence when 
viewed in light of the whole record before the court; 
(h) the agency action is: 
(i) an abuse of the discretion delegated to the agency by statute; 
(ii) contrary to a rule of the agency; 
(iii) contrary to the agency's prior practice, unless the agency justi-
fies the inconsistency by giving facts and reasons that demonstrate a 
fair and rational basis for the inconsistency; or 
(iv) otherwise arbitrary or capricious. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-16, enacted by L. appellate court" in Subsection (2)(a); and sub-
1987, ch. 161, § 272; 1988, ch. 72, § 26. stituted "appellate rules of the appropriate ap-
Amendment Notes. — The 1988 amend- pellate court" for "Utah Rules of Appellate Pro-
ment, effective April 25, 1988, substituted "As cedure" in Subsections (2)(a) and (2)(b). 
provided by statute, the Supreme Court or the Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
Court of Appeals" for "The Supreme Court or
 § 3 1 5 m a k e s t h e a c t effective on January 1, 
other appellate court designated by statute" in 1988 
Subsection (1); inserted "with the appropriate 
NOTES TO DECISIONS 
Function of district court. trict court will no longer function as intermedi-
Subsection (1) provides that all final agency ate appellate court except to review informal 
decisions through formal adjudicative proceed- adjudicative proceedings de novo pursuant to 
ings will be reviewed by the Utah Supreme § 63-46b-15(l)(a). In re Topik, 761 P.2d 32 
Court or Court of Appeals. Therefore, the dis- (Utah Ct. App. 1988). 
63-46b-17. Judicial review — Type of relief, 
(1) (a) In either the review of informal adjudicative proceedings by the 
district court or the review of formal adjudicative proceedings by an ap-
pellate court, the court may award damages or compensation only to the 
extent expressly authorized by statute. 
(b) In granting relief, the court may: 
(i) order agency action required by law; 
(ii) order the agency to exercise its discretion as required by law; 
(iii) set aside or modify agency action; 
(iv) enjoin or stay the efFee ive date of agency action; or 
(v) remand the matter to the agency for further proceedings. 
(2) Decisions on petitions for judicial review of final agency action are re-
viewable by a higher court, if authorized by statute. 
History: C. 1953, 63-46b-17, enacted by L. § 315 makes the act effective on January 1, 
1987, ch. 161, § 273. 1988. 
Effective Dates. — Laws 1987, ch. 161, 
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R861-1-7A. Evidence in Adjudicatory Proceed-
ings Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 
59-1-210, 76-8-502, 76-8-503, 63-46b-8. 
A. Introduction of Evidence. Every party appear-
ing before the Commission has the right to introduce 
evidence. Such evidence may be oral or written, real 
or demonstrative, direct or circumstantial. 
B. Presiding Officer. Any presiding officer, as set 
forth in Rule R861-1-1A, may preside at any proceed-
ing. The presiding officer shall rule and sign orders 
on matters concerning the evidentiary and proce-
dural conduct of the proceeding. 
C. Sworn Testimony, Oral testimony at a formal 
hearing will be 6worn. The oath will be administered 
by the presiding officer or a person designated by 
him. Anyone testifying falsely under oath may be 
subject to prosecution for perjury in accordance with 
the provisions of Utah Code Ann. Sections 76-8-502 
and 76-8-503. 
D. Exclusion of Evidence. The Commission may 
exclude evidence as being irrelevant, immaterial, or 
unduly repetitious. It will not be bound, however, by 
judicial tests of admissibility of evidence, but it may 
admit any reliable evidence possessing probative 
value which would be accepted by a reasonably pru-
dent man in the conduct of his affairs. The Commis-
sion may admit that kind of evidence known as hear-
say if such evidence meets this test; however, no deci-
sion of the Commission will be based solely on hear-
say evidence. 
E. Excluded Preferred Evidence. If a party at-
tempts to introduce evidence into a hearing, only to 
have such evidence excluded for any of the reasons 
above listed, he may require that such excluded testi-
mony or evidence be placed in the record to allow the 
reviewing judicial authority to pass on the correct-
ness of the ruling of exclusion on appeal. If such ex-
cluded evidence is deemed by the presiding officer to 
be repetitive, redundant, or unnecessarily lengthy, he 
may require the inclusion of such testimony in the 
record in condensed form. 
F. Order of Presentation. The order of presentation 
of evidence at a hearing is at the discretion of the 
presiding officer, but he will be guided by the ques-
tion of who at a given point must sustain the burden 
of proof. 
G. Burden of Proof. The petitioning party shall 
have the burden of proof to establish that his petition 
should be granted. 
H. Degree of Proof. The degree of proof in a hear-
ing before the Commission shall be the same as in a 
judicial proceeding brought in the state courts of 
Utah. 
I. Presentation of Commission's Case. The Com-
mission's case will be presented by the office of the 
Attorney General or by employees or authorized rep-
resentatives of the Commission. 
J. Official Notice. The Commission shall take offi-
cial notice of: 
1. the laws of the United States; 
2. the laws of the state of Utah; 
3. ail public and private official acts of the various 
agencies and divisions of the executive, legislative, 
and judicial departments of the United States and of 
the state of Utah and its political subdivisions; 
4. the official enacted statutes of the various states 
of the United States; 
5. seals of the United States and the state of Utah 
and all agencies and divisions thereof, including the 
seals of courts and of notary publics; 
6. the true, significant meaning of all words in the 
English language, including commonly used abbrevi-
ations and symbols; and 
7. the laws of science, the geography of the world, 
and the divisions of time, space, weight, and measure. 
8. The Commission may also take official notice of 
other matters of common knowledge and general ac-
ceptance and of publications or other commonly avail-
able information widely used and accepted in tax as-
sessment. Any party to the proceeding has the right 
to rebut or otherwise address the officially noticed 
material. 
9. In relation to the above, the Commission re-
serves the right to resort to appropriate reference ma-
terials in discovering and interpreting these matters 
and to rule on the admissibility or inadmissibility of 
these matters as to competence, materiality, and re-
dundancy. 
K. Official Commission Records and Documents. 
AH records and documents prepared by officials and 
employees of the Commission in performance of their 
official duties are prima facie evidence of the facts 
stated therein. Such records and documents shall be 
presumed to show the truth, but this presumption 
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may be rebutted. The Commission may refer to and 
rely upon these records in making decisions. If a rul-
ing is based in whole or in part on such records, the 
party affected by such ruling will have a right to ex-
amine them, unless such examination is prohibited 
by law, in which instance he will be apprised of the 
nature and contents of such records to the degree per-
missible under the terms of the law involved. No deci-
sion will be based solely on privileged or nonpublic 
records. 
L. Commission Knowledge and Investigation. The 
Commission may, in formulating its decision, rely 
upon its specialized knowledge and experience in tax-
ation and tax administration and upon evidence dis-
covered by its staff. However, no findings shall be 
based upon these matters without notification to the 
adverse party of the matters relied upon. 
M. Experts. Experts may testify in Commission 
hearings on behalf of any party of their special 
knowledge and competence. 
N. Privilege. The Commission will give effect to all 
rules of privilege recognized by law. If a party assert-
ing the truth of a certain claim, however, asserts a 
privilege in relation to evidence which would tend to 
support or refute such claim, and this evidence is par-
ticularly or solely available to him or those in a close 
interest or family relationship, and he can produce no 
evidence beyond this assertion, the Commission will 
reject such assertion. This rule will not apply, how-
ever, where the applicable law of privilege gives him 
no option but demands that he assert the claim of 
privilege in the particular situation. 
0. Uncontradicted Evidence. The Commission will 
accept uncontradicted evidence, unless inherently im-
probable, as being true. However, where such evi-
dence is solely and exclusively in the possession of the 
one offering the same or where it would be impossible 
or extremely difficult for the adverse party to obtain 
rebuttal evidence, the Commission reserves the right 
to give such uncontradicted evidence only the weight 
deemed fair, just, and proper. 
P. Cross Examination and Rebuttal. Any party to a 
Commission proceeding has the right to cross exam-
ine any witness testifying and to submit evidence in 
rebuttal of his testimony, which right shall include 
the right to challenge credibility or veracity of any 
witness or evidence offered. 
Q. Stipulation. Any party in an adjudicative pro-
ceeding may stipulate as to any fact or issue, and 
such stipulation may be introduced into a proceeding 
as evidence and may constitute the basis for an order. 
R. Precedents. The Commission may rely in its de-
cision making upon precedents from previous hear-
ings, but it is not bound by the doctrine of stare deci-
sis. 
S. Memoranda of Authority. Any party appearing 
before the Commission may submit a memorandum 
of authorities if he so wishes. The Commission may 
request such a memorandum from any party if 
deemed necessary for a full and informed consider-
ation of the problem. 
T. The Commission may relax the rules within the 
limits prescribed by law in informal proceedings in 
the interests of equity, expediency, and economy. 
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R861-1-9A. Tax Commission as Board of Equali-
zation Pursuant to Utah Code Ann. Sections 
59-5-212, 69-2-1003, and 69-2-1011. 
A. Equalization Responsibilities. The Commission 
will sit as the State Board of Equalization in dis-
charge of the equalization responsibilities given it by 
law. The Commission may sit on its own initiative to 
correct the valuation of property which has been 
overassessed, underassessed, or nonassessed as de-
scribed in Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-212; and as a 
board of appeal from the various county boards of 
equalization as described in Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-2-1011. 
B. Proceedings. A presiding officer may sit as the 
State Board of Equalization with the same force and 
effect as if the entire Commission were present Any 
order will be signed by a quorum of the Commission 
after they have become familiar with the evidence 
and have reviewed the legal arguments of the parties 
with the presiding officer. 
C. Appeals from County Boards. An appeal from a 
decision of a County Board of Equalization must be 
presented upon the same issues as were submitted to 
the county board in the first instance. The Commis-
sion shall consider but is not limited to, the facts and 
evidence submitted to the county board. 
D. Remand of Insufficient Appeal. The Commis-
sion may remand an appeal to the County Board of 
Equalization if: 
1. the minutes of the county board fail to conform 
with the requirements of Rule R861-1-9A-E, or 
2. in the interest of effective tax administration 
the matter can best be resolved by the county board. 
The Commission shall notify the county board of 
the order and the county board shall schedule a re-
hearing on the appeal within 20 days of the issuance 
of the notice. 
E. Minutes of the County Board. The County 
Board of Equalization or county hearing officer shall 
prepare minutes of hearings held before them on 
property tax appeals. The minutes shall include: 
1. the name and address of the property owner, 
2. the identification number, location, and descrip-
tion of the property; 
3. the value placed on the property by the assessor; 
4. the basis stated in the taxpayer's appeal; 
5. facts and issues raised in the hearing before the 
county board which are not clearly evident from the 
assessor's records; and 
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6. the decision of the County Board of Equalization 
and the reasons for the decision. 
F. Exempt Property. The County Board of Equali-
zation shall, in accordance with Utah Code Ann. Sec-
tions 59-2-1003 and 59-2-1011, with respect to a deci-
sion affecting the exempt status of a property, pre-
pare its decision in writing stating the reasons and 
statutory basis for the decision. 
G. Manner of Conducting Proceedings. Except as 
otherwise provided by law or these rules, the provi-
sions of Rules R861-1-4A, 6A, 6A, and 7A shall be 
applicable to proceedings before the State Board of 
Equalization. 
H. Definition of Statement "Within Ten Days" as 
Referred to in Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-1011. 
The term "within ten days after the final action of the 
county board," as used in Utah Code Ann. Section 
59-2-1011, means that a taxpayer shall have ten 
days, exclusive of weekends and holidays, from the 
date the county auditor mails the decision of the 
County Board of Equalization to the taxpayer, to ap-
peal that decision to the State Board of Equalization. 
For purposes of Utah Code Ann. Section 59-2-1011, 
the taxpayer's appeal shall be considered to have 
been filed on: 
1. the date the notice of appeal which is mailed to 
the county auditor's office is postmarked, or 
2. the date hand-delivered to the county auditor's 
office, or 
3. a notice filed by the taxpayer shall be presumed 
to have been timely filed unless the county auditor 
provides convincing evidence to the contrary, [n the 
absence of evidence of the date of mailing of the 
County Board of Equalization decision by the county 
auditor to the taxpayer, it shall be presumed that the 
decision was mailed three days after the meeting of 
the County Board of Equalization at which the deci-
sion was made. 
